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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH/WEST VALLEY : 
CITY, ! 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : 
MIKE REID, ! 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 950604-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE RONALD E. NEHRING 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(f), 1953 as 
amended and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR 
APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court committed error by failing to 
conduct a colloquy on the record between the court and the 
defendant to ensure that the defendant understood the risks of self 
representation and thus the consequence of his waiver of his 
constitutional right to assistance of counsel. 
The standard for review for this issue is clearly erroneous 
in examining whether the trial court's factual findings demonstrate 
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whether the Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right 
to counsel. See State vs. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah App. 1993) 
State vs. Drobel, 815 P.2d at 734. When determining whether the 
trial court applied the proper legal standard in reaching its 
decision to allow self-representation a correction of error 
standard is used. See State vs. Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
2. Was the testimony1 of witnesses1 Brandon Gillis and Vicky 
Green insufficient to support Defendant's conviction on the charge 
of "impersonation of an officer." 
The standard of review is clearly erroneous. See City of Orem 
vs. Ko-Tuna Lee, 846 P.2d 450 (Utah App. 1993), State vs. Walker, 
736 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. U.S. Constitution, Amendment VI: 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of 
the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
assistance of counsel for his defense. 
2. Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12: 
[Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
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testify in his own behalf, to be 
confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by 
an impartial jury of the county or 
district in which the offense is alleged 
to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against 
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise 
entitled to a preliminary examination, 
the function of that examination is 
limited to determining whether probable 
cause exists unless otherwise provided by 
statute. Nothing in this constitution 
shall preclude the use of reliable 
hearsay evidence as defined by statute or 
rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
3. Utah Code Annotated, §76-8-512, 1953 as amended: 
Impersonation of an officer. 
A person guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor who: 
(1) impersonates a public servant 
or a peace officer with intent to deceive 
another or with intent to induce another 
to submit to his pretended official 
authority or to rely upon his pretended 
official act; 
(2) falsely states he is a public 
servant or a peace officer with intent to 
deceive another or to induce another to 
submit to his pretended official 
authority or to rely upon his pretended 
official act; or 
(3) display or possesses without 
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authority any badge, identification card, 
other form of identification, any 
restraint device, or the uniform of any 
state of local government entity, or a 
reasonable facsimile transmission of any 
of these items, with the intent to 
deceive another or with the intent to 
induce another to submit to his pretended 
official authority or to rely upon his 
pretended official act. 
4. Rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure: 
(a) A defendant charged with a 
public offense has the right to self 
representation, and if indigent, has the 
right to court-appointed counsel if the 
defendant faces a substantial probability 
of deprivation of liberty. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Defendant/Appellant, Mike Reid will sometimes be referred 
to as Defendant and the Plaintiff/Appellee, which is State of 
Utah/West Valley City, will sometimes be referred to as State. 
"R." refers to Record; and "Ex." refers to Exhibit. "T.R." 
refers to Trial Transcript. 
A record of the proceedings in the trial court was made and 
transcribed and filed with the trial court on or about January 2, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff, State of Utah/West 
Valley City against the Defendant Michael Reid wherein Reid was 
charged in a formal information filed with the Third Judicial 
Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, West Valley Department for 
impersonation of an officer, a violation of Utah Code Annotated 
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§76-8-512, 1953 as amended, a class B misdemeanor. (R. 1-6) 
B. Course of Proceedings: 
This is an Appeal from a final judgment of the Third Judicial 
Circuit Court in and for Salt Lake County, West Valley Department, 
State of Utah before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring, District 
Court Judge, dated March 30, 1995, (R. 21) and said trial court's 
subsequent denial of Defendant's Motion for New Trial on the 2nd 
day of August, 1995 (R. 26). 
C. Disposition in Lower Court: 
On the 30th day of March, 1995, a trial was held in the Third 
Judicial Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, West Valley Department, 
before the Honorable Ronald E. Nehring. The State was represented 
by West Valley Prosecutor, Keith Stoney and Defendant appeared 
without counsel and represented himself. During the course of the 
trial the State called three witnesses, a Mr. Brandon Gillis, his 
mother, Vicky Lynn Green and Officer Coy Acocks of the West Valley 
Police Department. At the conclusion of the State's testimony the 
Defendant took the stand and testified on his own behalf. At the 
conclusion of the trial the Court found the Defendant guilty of the 
charge set forth in the information filed in this matter, to-wit: 
impersonation of an officer. (R. 21) 
After the judgment and subsequent sentencing of the Defendant 
on May 24, 1995, Defendant filed a Motion for New Trial with the 
trial Court on June 5, 1995 (R. 26). Thereafter the court denied 
said motion by way of a memorandum decision rendered and signed on 
August 3, 1995 (R. 46). 
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STATEMENT OF FJCTS 
On January 6, 1995 an information was filed in the Third 
Judicial Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, West Valley Department, 
State of Utah against the Defendant for impersonation of an officer 
in violation of Utah Code Annota. ad §76-8-512, a Class B 
misdemeanor (R. 1-6)• Said information was based upon the probable 
cause statement of Brandon Gillis, Vicky Green and Officer Coy 
Acocks of the West Valley Police Department who alleged the 
Defendant, during a telephone conversetion with Brandon Gillis and 
his mother, Vicky Green, represented that he was a police officer 
with the West Valley Police Department and requested of Ms. Green 
that Mr. Gillis1 pay for the damage to the security officer's tires 
which had been slashed at the apartment complex by Mr. Gillis and 
threatened that charges would be filed against Mr. Gillis if he 
failed to pay. 
After the aforementioned phone cell Ms. Green testified she 
contacted the West Valley City Police Department and both her and 
Mr. Gillis reported the incident and identified the Defendant as 
the caller whereupon an investigation was conducted and charges 
filed against the Defendant for impersonation of a police officer. 
This matter came on for trial on March 30, 1995. The court 
called the case as one of a number set on its non-jury calendar. 
When the Court called the matter as West Valley City vs. Reid the 
Defendant responded and the Court confirmed that Mr. Reid was in 
fact the Defendant (T.R. page 61, lines 2-4). The Court then 
instructed the Defendant where to sit in the court room and briefly 
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explained the format for conducting the trial. At no time, did the 
Court inquire of Mr. Reid whether he was representing himself or 
whether his decision for self-representation was voluntary and had 
been made knowingly and intelligently. Nor did the Court establish 
that the Defendant understood the risks of declining legal counsel 
(T.R. page 61). 
After the Court explained the format of the trial the State 
called its first witness Mr. Gillis who tescified that he received 
a phone call on his pager on August 11, 1994, and "vaguely" 
recognized the number as that of the Defendant. Mr. Gillis further 
testified that subsequent thereto he called the number left on his 
pager and that the party who answered the telephone answered the 
call with the salutation, West Valley P.D.(T.R. page 73, lines 2-
21). Mr. Gillis testified he recognized the voice of the person on 
the phone as that of the Defendant based upon the previous 
telephone call that he had with the Defendant (T.R. page 73, lines 
7-9). Mr. Gillis said that the caller requested his mother's work 
phone number so that he could call her at work however, Mr. Gillis 
indicated that his mother was at home and took the phone to his 
mother who spoke with the caller (T.R. page 74, lines 1-13). The 
caller did not identify himself as a police officer nor did he 
request anything of Mr. Gillis although later in his testimony 
under leading and suggestive questioning by the prosecutor, Mr. 
Gillis did testify that he believed the caller used the name of an 
officer when he spoke with him (T.R. page 75, lines 8-18). 
When Ms. Green was given the telephone, she spoke with the 
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caller who she testified identified hi.iself as an Officer Briddem. 
Ms. Green testified that the caller to id her that her son, Brandon 
Gillis, had been accused of slashing tires &t the apartment complex 
and that her son either needed to pay the security officer for his 
tires which had been slashed or charges would be pressed (T.R. page 
85, lines 2-12). Prior to this incident Ms. Green had neither met 
nor spoken with the Defendant (T.R. page 87, lines 6-8 and lines 
17-18). The identification of the Defendant as the caller by Ms. 
Green was based solely upon her equivocal recognition of 
Defendant's voice at the time of trial as that of the caller almost 
8 months previous to August 11, 1994. 
Based upon the testimony of these two witnesses and Officer 
Acocks who testified that there was no Officer Briddem employed 
with the West Valley Police Department, the Court found the 
Defendant guilty of the charge of impersonation of an officer (T.R. 
page 91, lines 18-25, T.R. page 92, lines 1-2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial Court committed reversible error by failing to 
conduct a colloguy with the Defendant to determine whether the 
Defendant possessed adequate intelligence and knowledge about the 
potential ramifications of voluntary self-representation. Second, 
the clear weight of evidence in this case is against the verdict 
rendered by the Court due to the uncertain and inconsistent 
statements concerning the identification of the Defendant as the 
perpetrator. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT MUST CONDUCT A COLLOQUY WITH A 
DEFENDANT WHO CHOOSES SELF-REPRESENTATION AND THE 
FAILURE TO DO SO CONSTITUTEJ REVERSIBLE ERROR 
While the right to defend oneself in a criminal prosecution is 
well established and protected under the jixth amendment to the 
United States Constitution and made applicable to the state 
criminal prosecutions by the United States Supreme Court holding in 
Faretta vs. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.ed 2nd 
562 (1975) such right is also guaianteed by the Utah State 
Constitution under Utah Constitution Article I, §12 and under Rule 
8 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, our Supreme 
Court has mandated that the trial Court must scrutinize a 
Defendant's invocation of this right since the exercise of self-
representation necessarily constitutes a waiver of the right to 
counsel. 
In State vs. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah App. 1993) this court 
held: 
"Inasmuch as the exercise of the 
right of self-representation 
necessarily constitutes a waiver of 
the right to counsel, the trial 
court has the duty, to determine 
that a defendant has knowingly and 
intelligently chosen self-
representation ." 
The Court went on to say that while such a determination turns 
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case 
the Court must make this determination using a standard whereby the 
Court can determine that the Defendant, with adeguate intelligence 
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and knowledge about the potential ramifications, voluntarily 
chooses self-representation. Id. at 6 33. The Court stated: 
"The Defendant should be made aware of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation so that the record will 
establish that the Defendant knows what 
he is doing and his choice is mrtde with 
eyes open." 
The Court in its analysis went on to say that the only way 
that this can be accomplished is for the Court to conduct 
penetrating questioning and that the preferred method would be a 
colloquy on the record between the Court and the Defendant to 
ascertain the basis of the waiver so as to ensure that the 
Defendant understands the risks of self-representation. Id. at 
633. In this regard the Court stated as follows: 
"Generally this information can only be 
elicited after penetrating questioning by 
the trial court. Therefore, a colloquy 
on the record between the court and the 
accused is the preferred method of 
ascertaining the validity of a waiver 
because it ensures that defendants 
understand the risks of self-
representation. Moreover, it is the most 
efficient means by which appeals may be 
limited." 
This Court relying upon the holding in State vs. Drobel, 815 
P.2d at 732 further stated that if the Defendant states that he 
understands the disadvantages of self-representation and that the 
decision is voluntary.... self-representation should be permitted. 
Id. at 633. However, the Court went on to hold that unless a trial 
court has determined that the Defendant has not knowingly and 
intelligently chosen self-representation it must allow and honor 
the Defendant's request of self-representation. Id. at 633. In 
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this regard the Court held as follows: 
"This precedent leads us to conclude that 
unless a trial court appropriately finds 
that a defendant has not knowingly and 
intelligently chosen self-representation, 
it must honor that defendant's choice. 
The right to defend oneself is a 
personal, constitutional right, which a 
court should only deny if it finds that 
the waiver of the right to counsel was 
not made "knowingly and intelligently." 
The decision in this case was appealed to the Supreme Court on 
a writ of certiorari. On appeal our Supreme Court upheld the 
decision of this Court and reaffirmed that the trial Court must 
conduct a colloguy with the Defendant and therein advise the 
Defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. 
The Court also concurred that the trial Court's omission of such a 
colloquy was not harmless error and should result in a remand of 
the matter back to the trial Court for a new trial. See State vs. 
Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993). 
As to the facts at hand we note the record is completely 
devoid of any such colloquy between the Court and the Defendant 
wherein the Court attempted to ascertain whether the Defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel and choose 
self-representation. The Court's failure to conduct such a 
colloquy is not harmless error therefore the matter should be 
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 
POINT II 
THE VERDICT RENDERED IN THIS MATTER IS AGAINST THE 
CLEAR WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IN THAT THE IDENTIFICATION OF 
THE DEFENDANT IS VAGUE AND BASED UPON CONSISTENT TESTIMONY 
Our Supreme Court has held that a verdict for a bench trial in 
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a criminal case should not be overtu ~ned unless the verdict is 
against the clear weight of evidence or if the Appellate Court 
otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made and that this determination shall be made under a clearly 
erroneous standard. See State vs. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1987) . 
Also, this Court later articulated in City of Qrem vs. Ko-Tung 
Lee, 846 P.2d 450 (Utah App. 1993) that the Court in a bench trial 
in a criminal case, must in rendering its verdict, make specific 
findings of fact regarding its verdict. The Court held as follows: 
"The standard of review for bench trials 
in criminal cases is derived from Rule 
52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. That rule provides, in part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts 
specially...Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses." 
Defendant was charged in this matter with impersonation of an 
officer in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-8-512, 1953 as 
amended. Said provision reads in pertinent part as follows: 
"A person is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor who.... 
(2) falsely states he is a public 
servant or a peace officer with intent to 
deceive another or to induce another to 
submit to his pretended official 
authority or to rely upon his pretended 
official act" 
Accordingly, the State must prove as the corpus delicti of 
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this charge that the Defendant falsely stated that he was a peace 
officer with the intent to deceive another or to induce another to 
submit to his pretended official autt ority or to rely upon his 
pretended official act. 
In examining the facts in this matter v;e note that not only is 
the evidence on its face insufficient to support the corpus delicti 
of this charge but the Court's judgment and verdict is wanting in 
its absence of any findings to support said verdict. 
In the prosecution of this case the State relied exclusively 
upon the testimony of two witnesses to establish the elements of 
this offense, a Brandon Gillis and Mr. nillis1 mother, Vicky Green. 
The testimony of these two witnesses failed to establish by any 
credible standard that the perpetrator of the call was the 
Defendant. 
First, Mr. Gillis testified that he received a call to his 
pager on or about the 11th day of August, 1994. Mr. Gillis then 
claimed that he recognized the number on the pager as that of the 
Defendants since the Defendant had allegedly called Mr. Gillis the 
day before. (T.R. page 63, lines 6 through 12). 
Q Did you get another page later? 
A Yes. I do believe it was the next day. 
Q Okay. And that would have been the 11th? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Is that the same day that you reported it to the 
police, August 11th? 
A Yes. It is. 
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However, Mr. Gillis in later testimony equivocates as to his 
prior identification of Defendant's telephone number on his pager 
on August 11, 1994. His testimony in this regard was as follows: 
(T.R. page 73, lines 2 through 18). 
Q Okay. So you received a paga again on that day? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you call the number? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And who was on the other line? 
A They said it was West Valley P.D., but I recognized the 
voice from the other time. 
Q Okay. First of all, was it the same number you called 
the day before? 
A The first number? 
Q Yes. 
A I vaguely remember, because I threw away the notes 
because I did not think anything was going to happen with the case. 
(Emphasis added). 
Q Do you think it was the first number? 
A Yes. I do. 
Mr. Gillis then testifies that he returns the call to the 
number on the pager and that the caller upon answering Mr. Gillis' 
call responds with the salutation of West Valley Police Department. 
Mr. Gillis testified as follows: (T.R. page 73, lines 19 through 
21) . 
Q Okay. And there was a voice on the other line that said 
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it was West Valley P.D.? 
A Yes. 
Mr. Gillis then goes on in his testimony and claims that the 
caller at no time stated that he was a police officer during his 
conversation with him. In this regard Mr. Gillis testifies as 
follows: (T.R. page 76, lines 2 through 6). 
Q Okay. Did this officer or did this person on the phone, 
did Mr. Reid ask you to pay any money when he talked to you? 
A He did not ask me to. When he said he was the Officer, 
he was talking to my mother at that time. (Emphasis added). 
Mr. Gillis then testifies that he turned the telephone over to 
his mother and upon doing so told her bhat it was the Defendant on 
the telephone pretending to be a police officer. "His testimony in 
this regard was as follows: (T.R. page 74, lines 14 through 24). 
Q And when you got your mother to get on the phone, did you 
tell her that it was Mr. Reid on the phone? 
A I said it's Mr. Reid and he's pretending to be a police 
officer is what I said. 
Q Did you sit there while she talked on the phone? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And I assume that phone conversation ended shortly 
thereafter? 
A Yes. It did. 
The prosecution then continued its line of questioning 
regarding how the caller had identified himself. In this exchange 
Mr. Gillis contradicts his earlier testimony where he claimed that 
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the caller did not identify himself as an officer and indicates the 
caller identified himself by two different names, a sergeant West 
and then an Officer Briddem. His testimony in this regard was as 
follows: (T.R. page 75, lines 8 through 25, and page 76, line 1). 
Q Okay. Do you remember if there were any names used, did 
he tell you what his name was, officer so and so or anything like 
that, or how he identified himself? 
A It was Officer West was the Sergeant I think it was. 
Q Okay. 
A And the Officer he said he was is Briddem. 
Q Okay. And do you remember how to spell that, or did you 
ask for it to be spelled or was it just Briddem? 
A My mother asked how is was spelled and it was B-R-I-D-D-
E-M. 
Q Okay. But that's who you — you heard him say it was 
Officer Briddem? (Emphasis added. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. But you knew it wasn't Officer Briddem didn't 
you. 
A. Yes. 
However, Mr. Gillis' later testimony again contradicts his 
previous statements on how the caller identified himself. Mr. 
Gillis now testifies that he was not listening to the conversation 
when the caller identified himself as Officer Briddem. It is also 
worth noting in this exchange that Mr. Gillis' acknowledges that 
the caller does not attempt to have him "submit" to or "rely upon" 
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the caller's pretended official authority an element of the offense 
with which the Defendant is charged. His testimony in this regard 
was as follows: (T.R. page 76, lines 2 through 11). 
Q Okay. Did this officer or did this person on the phone, 
did Mr. Reid ask you to pay any money when he talked to you? 
A He did not ask me to. When he said he was the Officer, 
he was talking to my mother at that time. 
Q Okay. So you — you — but you weren't listening at the 
conversation at that point? 
A No. 
Q You could only hear your mom talk? 
A Yeah. 
In an effort to further clarify Mr. Gillis1 inconsistent 
testimony the Court interposes some questions of its own in an 
attempt to clarify its obvious confusion. In this exchange Mr. 
Gillis claims that the caller did not identify himself by name 
contrary to his previous testimony however, this testimony is 
consistent with his original testimony on this issue. (T.R. page 
80, lines 17 through 22). 
Q All right. Mr. Gillis, before you step down, I just have 
a couple of questions. During the conversation in which according 
to you it was Mr. Reid who identified himself as a police officer, 
he did not use the name of an individual; is that right? 
A He did not. 
Then in an obvious attempt to rehabilitate the witness the 
prosecutor follows with questioning regarding the statement Mr. 
18 
Gillis just made that the caller did not use any name during the 
telephone conversation with him. (T.R. page 80, lines 5 through 
12) . 
Q I'm a little confused after that question. Mr. Gillis, 
just one more question. 
A Did he use the name of an Officer though? Did he tell 
you his name was Officer so and so when he talked to you? 
Q I do believe he did. 
A And that's the Briddem that you gave us? 
Q Yeah. 
However, we note that even in this exchange Mr. Gillis 
equivocates in his answer by saying that "I do believe he did" when 
responding to the question as to whether the caller identified 
himself by name and that he was an Officer. 
After that exchange the Court again is confused by Mr. Gillis' 
testimony causing the Court to seek further clarification on the 
issue as to how the caller identified himself to Mr. Gillis. In 
this exchange Mr. Gillis again contradicts his previous testimony 
as to how the caller identified himself. (T.R. page 82, lines 2 
through 11). 
Q Okay. Mr. Gillis, let's see if you can now resolve my 
confusion. I apologize for the interruption. Mr. Gillis, am I 
correct if I were to say that when you first answered Mr. Stoney's 
questions that you said that the caller may have identified himself 
as Officer Briddem, but that he made such an identification of 
himself to your mother, and that he didn't give a name in reference 
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to you? 
A I was on the phone at the time that he said his name as 
Officer Briddem. 
The prosecution then called Mr. Gillis1 mother Vicky Green as 
its second witness• Ms. Green testified that she had in fact never 
spoken or met the Defendant before her telephone conversation on 
August 11, 1994. Her testimony in this regard is as follows: 
(T.R. page 83, lines 11 through 13). 
Q Now have you ever met Mr. Reid before, ma!am? 
A No. I have not. 
Ms. Green next testifies that her son came to her and gave her 
the phone indicating that the caller wished to speak to her. Her 
testimony in this regard is as follows: (T.R. page 83, lines 14 
through 21). 
Q Do you recall on that day receiving a phone call, on 
August 11th I believe, receiving a phone call where someone 
identified himself as a police officer to you? 
A Yes. I do. 
Q Just prior to that time, did your son come and notify you 
that you were wanted on the phone? 
A Yes. 
Ms, Green then testifies that she spoke with the caller who 
identified himself as an Officer Briddem. Her testimony in this 
regard is as follows: (T.R. page 84, lines 2 through 14). 
Q Okay. Did you talk on the phone then at that point in 
time? 
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A Yes. 
Q What happened when you answered the phone? 
A I said hello and he said this is Officer, and he kind of 
mumbled. I couldn't quite understand him. And I said excuse me 
and then he said his name again, he said Officer Briddem, and I 
asked him if he could spell it. 
Q And did he spell it? 
A He did spell it for me. 
Q And how did he spell it for you? 
A B-R-I-D-D-E-M. 
Ms. Green then recounted the conversation she had between 
herself and the caller. Her testimony in this regard was as 
follows: (T.R. page 85, lines 2 through 15). 
A At that point in time he told me that my son had been 
accused of slashing tires at the apartment complex by the Security 
Officer, and I had — and he said that Brandon (Gillis) needed to 
either pay the Security Officer money or charges would be pressed 
and the people — Jessie's family would be evicted out of the 
apartment complex. And I told him that was not my problem what 
they did with Jessie and his family, but if he wanted to press 
charges against Brandon that that's what would need to be done, but 
Brandon was not going to be paying any money. 
The prosecution then proceeds to have Ms. Green identify the 
Defendant as the caller. In this regard, Ms. Green testifies as 
follows: (T.R. page 87, lines 2 through 11). 
Q And you've heard now Mr. Reid speak here today, and I 
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realize it's been a long time and you may or may not be able to 
recognize his voice. Can you tell us if it sounds the same or if 
it's him or not? 
A Actually, because I had only talked to him the one time, 
but as soon as I heard him speak here today, it sounded very 
familiar. 
Q Okay. Could you say for sure if it was him or not? 
A I think yes, it was. 
Clearly reliance upon the testimony of Mr. Gillis and Ms. 
Green in establishing the corpus delicti of the charge of 
impersonation of an officer against this Defendant is error and an 
obvious mistake. The Court's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt cannot be justified when considering the freguent 
inconsistencies of Mr. Gillis' testimony and the unreliable 
identification of Ms. Green. 
First, Mr. Gillis' identification of the caller is fraught 
with reasonable doubt and does not support the verdict in this 
matter. Not only does the foregoing establish that the caller 
never attempted to have Mr. Gillis1 submit or rely upon his 
pretended official authority but Gillis' testimony is also highly 
suspect in establishing whether the caller ever identified himself 
as an officer to Mr. Gillis. 
Mr. Gillis contradicts his testimony on four different 
occasions as to whether the caller ever identified himself as an 
officer. This contradiction also extended to the issue of whether 
the caller identified himself by name and what name he used. When 
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the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt such obvious 
inconsistencies cannot support a verdict of guilty. This Court 
should without pause be able to reach a "definite and firm" 
conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Upon further scrutiny of Mr. Gillis1 testimony a seemingly 
subtle but no less important fact stands out that also calls into 
question the reliability of Mr. Gillis1 testimony which the trial 
Court either ignored or failed to focus on. When Mr. Gillis first 
testified concerning his call allegedly to the Defendant, he 
testified that when the party whom he believed to be the Defendant 
answered his call he greeted him with the salutation of West Valley 
Police Department. What is remarkable about this testimony is the 
highly improbable likelihood that the Defendant could anticipate 
that the call which came to his number was placed by Mr. Gillis and 
he having anticipated the same would have answered his telephone 
"West Valley Police Department" (T.R. page 73, lines 2-9). When 
considering the other inconsistencies in Mr. Gillis1 testimony this 
improbable exchange calls into question the reliability of any of 
this witnesses testimony and should further obviate that the trial 
Court's reliance on Mr. Gillis1 testimony was a mistake and that 
the subsequent verdict was against the clear weight of evidence. 
Secondly, while Ms. Green testified that the caller identified 
himself as a police officer and apparently attempted to get Ms. 
Green to submit or rely upon his pretended official authority by 
requesting that her son reimburse the Defendant for his slashed 
tires the circumstances surrounding her identification are highly 
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unreliable. As the foregoing testimony demonstrated Ms. Green had 
prior to August 11, 1994 never met or spoke with the Defendant. 
Her identification of the Defendant in Court on March 30, 1995, was 
based solely upon her apparent recognition of the Defendant's voice 
in the courtroom from one brief telephone conversation which 
occurred almost eight months previous. Further, Ms. Green's 
testimony concerning her identification is equivocal in nature. 
Her testimony in this regard is as follows: (T.R. page 87, lines 2 
through 11). 
Q And you've heard now Mr. Rcid speak here today, and I 
realize it's been a long time and you may or may not be able to 
recognize his voice. Can you tell us if it sounds the same or if 
it's him or not? 
A Actually, because I had only talked to him the one time, 
but as soon as I heard him speak here today, it sounded very 
familiar. 
Q Okay. Could you say for sure if it was him or not? 
A I think ves, it was. (Emphasis added). 
The testimony of Ms. Green is highly unreliable and cannot in 
and of itself justify a verdict of guilt in a criminal case 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The eight months which 
elapsed between the brief conversation she purportedly had with the 
Defendant and her recognition of his voice as that of the caller on 
August 11, 1994 is not only highly unreliable but improbable. Even 
when considering Ms. Green's testimony in conjunction with the 
testimony of Mr. Gillis the verdict cannot be justified. Mr. 
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Gillis own equivocation on the issue of identity of the caller 
cannot be seen to bolster in anyway Ms. Green's identification of 
the Defendant as the caller. 
CONCLUSION 
The holding in the Baklov decision establishes unequivocally 
that before the trial Court can permit a Defendant to exercise his 
constitutional privilege of self-representation it must conduct a 
colloquy on the record wherein the Court ascertains whether the 
Defendant possesses adequate intelligence und knowledge about the 
potential ramifications of voluntary self representation. The 
Court's failure to do so is reversible error and should result in 
the Defendant being granted a new trial. The record being devoid 
of any such colloquy mandates that the verdict be set aside and the 
matter remanded back to the trial Court for a new trial. 
While the verdict in a bench trial in a criminal case is given 
great deference, the holding by this Court has established a 
verdict obtained which is against the clear weight of evidence or 
which results through mistake should not be permitted to stand. 
The record in this matter obviates that the verdict is against the 
clear weight of evidence and is a mistake. Furthermore, the 
absence of specific findings by the trial Court to support its 
verdict should weigh heavily when considering how much deference to 
extend to its verdict. 
Therefore, Defendant respectfully requests that the verdict of 
the trial Court be set aside and that this matter be remanded to 
the trial Court for a new trial. 
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